Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO\u27s View of Public Goods by Mavroidis, Petros C.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2012 
Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO's View of Public 
Goods 
Petros C. Mavroidis 
Columbia Law School, petros.mavroidis@unine.ch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO's View of Public Goods, 23 EUR. J. 
INT'L. L. 731 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1082 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
The European Journal of  International Law Vol. 23 no. 3 
© The Author, 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf  of  EJIL Ltd.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
EJIL (2012), Vol. 23 No. 3, 731–742 doi:10.1093/ejil/chs055
Free Lunches? WTO as Public 
Good, and the WTO’s View of  
Public Goods
Petros C. Mavroidis* 
Abstract
The WTO can be viewed as a public good in that it provides a forum for negotiations which 
also produces the necessary legal framework to act as a support for agreed liberalization. To 
avoid any misunderstandings, in this article the discussion focuses on the WTO as a forum 
and a set of  agreements, not on free trade. Since the legal agreements coming under its aegis 
are for good reasons incomplete, the WTO provides an additional public good by ‘completing’ 
the original contract through case law. The importance of  this feature increases over time as 
tariffs are driven towards irrelevance. In turn, the WTO has no particular attitude towards 
public goods provided by its Members.
1 Introduction
There are two dimensions in the discussion regarding the WTO and public goods, 
depending on the perspective adopted: on the one hand, whether the WTO can be 
viewed as a public good, and if  so which aspects of  the WTO? And, on the other, how 
does the WTO view public goods?
To respond to the first question, I assume the commonplace definition for public 
good (non-rival and non-excludable) and build on a distinction between the design 
and the actual use of  the WTO first discussed in Staiger.1 In short, the idea is that 
the WTO is a public good in the sense that it provides a forum that is necessary to 
address (negative) external effects stemming from the unilateral definition of  trade 
policies. Similar effects stem, in the classic formulation of  the terms of  trade theory, 
from unilateral tariff-setting: trading nations have little, if  any, incentive to control 
for the effects of  their tariffs on their partners; they will typically set them taking into 
* Edwin B. Parker Professor of  Law at Columbia Law School on leave at the European University Institute, 
Florence. I am indebted to Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert W. Staiger for their helpful comments. Email: 
petros.mavroidis@eui.eu.
1 See R.W. Staiger, Report on the International Trade Regime for the International Task Force on Global Public 
Goods (2004).
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account their own producer and consumer welfare. To the extent that they have bar-
gaining power, they can affect terms of  trade when doing so. Absent an international 
agreement that will help ‘internalize’ similar effects, one could end up in a spiral of  
unilateral tariff-setting that will be met by retaliatory responses.2 The GATT (and now 
the WTO) is the instrument that helps to address this issue.3
In its original form, the GATT was meant to provide an insurance policy against 
those incentivized to circumvent their tariff  promise:4 this could happen since tariffs 
could be decomposed into taxes for consumers cum subsidies to producers (equiva-
lence propositions), and, thus, absent a commitment on domestic instruments as well 
(such as domestic taxes and subsidies) the tariff  promise could become meaningless.5
Baldwin,6 with his wonderfully simple yet highly accurate tide metaphor, explained 
why it was only sensible for negotiators to focus initially on tariffs: high tariffs obscured 
the ‘bite’ of  non-tariff  barriers (domestic instruments). Terms of  trade can, moreover, 
be affected through domestic instruments as well, and not just through tariffs. Indeed, 
what is the difference between a 100 per cent import tariff  and a 100 per cent con-
sumption tax?7 And indeed, the gradual reduction of  tariffs brought the bite of  domes-
tic instruments (policies) to the fore and negotiators were asked to address them in 
order to preserve the value of  their prior efforts: this is in essence the ‘bicycle’ and/
or ‘tricycle’ theory that Bhagwati developed in his writings8 that we discuss in more 
detail infra. This is why to discuss the WTO as public good one needs also to focus on 
the legal arsenal that has been added to the original GATT.
One caveat is necessary here at the outset: the WTO is not free for all; in fact 
non-Members are excluded from using this forum.9 And to become a Member one 
2 See Johnson, ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’, 1 Rev Economic Studies (1953–1954) 142.
3 The rationale for the GATT is not solely dependent on a prior espousing of  the terms of  trade explanation: 
indeed the GATT has also been explained by some as an instrument to avoid future inconsistent behav-
iour (‘commitment’ theory): see J. Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies (1985), and 
more recently Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, ‘The Value of  Trade Agreements in the Presence of  Political 
Pressures’, 106 J Political Economy (1998) 574. The persuasiveness of  this theory to explain the original 
GATT is doubtful in light of  the very limited commitment regarding domestic instruments. Irrespective 
of  the rationale for it, it is the aspect of  the GATT to serve as a forum for international trade negotiations 
that makes it a public good.
4 See C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (1949).
5 For a formal explanation see K. Bagwell and R.W. Staiger, The Economics of  the World Trading System 
(2002); Limão, Broda, and Weinstein,’Optimal Tariffs: the Evidence’, 98 Am Economic Rev (2008) 2032 
have provided empirical proof  of  the theoretical terms-of-trade argument.
6 See R. Baldwin, Non-tariff  Distortions in International Trade (1970).
7 See Ossa, ‘A New Trade Theory of  GATT/WTO Negotiations’, 119 J Political Economy (2011) 122.
8 See J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1998), and J. Bhagwati, Termites in the World Trading System (2008).
9 There is a caveat to the caveat: preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are now routinely notified between 
WTO Members and non-Members (Bahamas, e.g., participates in the EU–Cariforum agreement. 
This practice is contra legem, since Art. XXIV(5) GATT states that ‘[a]ccordingly, the provisions of  this 
Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of  contracting parties, the formation of  a customs 
union or of  a free-trade area or the adoption of  an interim agreement necessary for the formation of  a 
customs union or of  a free-trade area’ (emphasis added). Participation in a PTA does not amount, of  
course, to participation in the WTO. Still, non-Members can be treated better than WTO Members in the 
markets of  some WTO Members with which they have formed a PTA.
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needs to pay a price, a ‘ticket to enter’ which, as the years go by, becomes more and 
more expensive. A look into China’s Protocol of  Accession as well as all protocols of  
accession post-1995 and a comparison with accessions before the Uruguay round 
amply prove this point.10 It follows that to start thinking of  the WTO as public good 
one needs to make a generous concession and think of  it not as a good free for all but 
as one only for its Members. Secondly, usually when referring to public goods one has 
in mind private citizens enjoying, say, clean air or a park for free. Here the units of  
account are states and not citizens and, as argued above, not all states.11
With regard to the second question addressed in this article, namely how does the 
WTO address public goods, our discussion will be briefer: the rationale for brevity is 
that the WTO has not developed a comprehensive approach towards public goods, 
although indirectly its actions may not be inconsequential.
With this in mind, in section 2 we discuss the WTO as a public good; section 3 focuses 
on the WTO’s (non-)approach towards public goods, while section 4 concludes.
2 The WTO, a Public Good
In this section, I build on Staiger,12 who distinguished between the creation/estab-
lishment of  the GATT/WTO on the one hand, and its use on the other. In his view, 
whereas the former has public good features, the latter is prone to use for private ends. 
I find this distinction sensible. In what follows, I will concentrate a little more on the 
GATT/WTO regime of  today, that is, the trade institution as a law-making entity, a 
point already noted by Staiger, albeit en passant.
Kindleberger13 observes that public goods are typically under-produced not
for the Galbraithian reason that private goods are advertised and public goods are not – but because 
the consumer who has access to the good anyhow has little reason to vote the taxes, or pay his or her 
appropriate share. Unless the consumer is a highly moral person, following the Kantian Catgeorical 
Imperative of  acting in ways which can be generalized, he or she is apt to be a ‘free rider’.
How much of  this is true as far as the WTO is concerned?
A A Forum for Tariff  Negotiations
The list of  public goods provided by Adam Smith14 was limited to national defence, 
law and order, and public works. Ever since, most people would agree that weights and 
10 This is the natural consequence of  mainly two factors: MFN (most favoured nation) trade is more of  a 
value nowadays than, say, 20 years ago, when accession to the GATT amounted to MFN-trade with coun-
tries controlling 60–70% of  world trade, while it is nowadays over 90%. Moreover, it is typically former 
non-market economies that have joined the WTO post-1995 and have been required to make changes in 
many domestic policies before accession.
11 The WTO is excludable but not rival in consumption; that is, it exhibits the characteristics of  a natural 
monopoly, like fire protection, cable TV, or even uncongested toll roads.
12 Supra note 1.
13 See Kindleberger, ‘International Public Goods without International Government’, 76 Am Economic Rev 
(1986) 1.
14 See A. Smith, The Theory of  Moral Sentiments (1759).
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measures, language, and money would qualify as such. In the international sphere, 
public goods are produced to serve common purposes. Political science has produced 
two schools: the realists, who argue that public goods are produced by a leading power, 
the ‘hegemon’, and the moralists (or institutionalists), who argue that hegemons set 
in motion regimes of  international cooperation. Krasner15 and Keohane16 (especially 
the latter) discuss these schools in more detail. Of  interest to us is that the free trade 
regime is the outcome of  British and the subsequent US hegemony that put in place 
the regime for cooperation, the original GATT.17
Governments have a shared interest in the creation and maintenance of  the WTO: 
absent this forum, negotiations on mutually advantageous tariff  concessions would 
not have taken place and one would risk spiralling into retaliatory tariffs. At the same 
time, it is hard to imagine why one trading nation would have the incentive to provide 
this good – there is an undeniable collective action issue here.18
Bargaining involves bargaining externalities as well: this point is intimately linked 
with the discussion under 2C infra, since trading nations will use the WTO to pur-
sue private goods. Home will discuss tariff  exchanges with Foreign on items of  export 
interest to Home and not to a third country. In extreme form, bargaining externalities 
could put into question the very existence of  the edifice: it is disturbing, to say the 
least, that every time a negotiating round hits deadlock voices are raised to the effect 
that the WTO edifice as such is in grave danger. Are such fears unfounded?
The response to this question is multi-faceted, and much of  it depends on difficult to 
quantify factors, such as willingness to invest political capital in the successful conclu-
sion of  rounds, etc. At a narrower level, Bhagwati19 first explained why, assuming the 
bicycle goes the right way, the value of  concessions made depends also on the continua-
tion of  the liberalization process. He20 expanded on that and produced what he termed 
the ‘tricycle’ theory:21 developing countries will sometimes sign preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) with other countries at the same development level, hoping to learn from 
such PTAs without fearing massive disruptions from unequal competition; they will 
then and only then move to non-discriminatory (MFN, most favoured nation) competi-
tion. The point is that the continuous existence and relevance of  the WTO holds the key 
in securing that past concessions will continue to be valuable to participants.
The GATT/WTO, by any reasonable benchmark, has been quite successful in dis-
mantling tariff  protection over the years.22 It has also managed to add an impressive 
15 See S.D. Krasner, International Regimes (1983).
16 See R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984).
17 See D.A. Irwin, P.C. Mavroidis, and A.O. Sykes, The Genesis of  the GATT (2008).
18 In Mankiw’s inimitable expression, ‘markets work well when the good is ice cream, but they work badly 
when the good is clean air’: see G.N. Mankiw, Principles of  Economics (5th edn, 2008), at 226.
19 Bhagwati, Protectionism, supra note 8.
20 Bhagwati, Termites, supra note 8.
21 Inspired by the fact that timid children will go on to a bicycle after having first experienced a tricycle in 
order to reassure and acclimatize themselves to having their feet off  the ground.
22 Irwin, ‘Changes in US Tariffs: the Role of  Import Prices and Commercial Policies’, 88 Am Economic Rev 
(1998) 1015 and Irwin, ‘The Smoot–Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment’, 80 Rev Economics and 
Statistics (1998) 326 provides the most comprehensive quantification of  tariffs since the inception of  the 
GATT and leading up to the post-Uruguay round era.
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regulatory framework aimed at supporting the liberalization efforts, a point to which 
we will come back in the next sub-section. Of  course the problems surrounding the 
continuing Doha round have cast some doubt on this rosy picture. There are mitigat-
ing factors explaining the current difficulties in concluding the Doha round and they 
should be taken into account: there are more players, more agreements to be nego-
tiated, a theme (trade and development) that is proving more difficult to tackle and 
more divisive than originally anticipated, the impending US elections, etc. At any rate, 
on present evidence, it will be quite an exaggeration to argue that the bicycle theory 
no longer obtains in the multilateral trade talks.
The threat, if  one exists, comes from the proliferation of  PTAs, and more specifi-
cally from their content: Horn et al.23 examine the subject matter of  PTAs concluded 
by two hubs (EU, US) with various spokes between 1992 and 2008, and divide it into 
WTO+ (‘WTO plus’, say tariff  cuts beyond the MFN-level), and WTOx (‘WTO extra’, 
issues that do not come under the mandate of  the WTO, say positive integration in 
fields such as environmental policy, the fight against corruption, etc.). The WTOx 
part of  the PTAs is quite substantial. This article thus suggests that the rationale for 
going preferential should also be sought in WTOx-type obligations. There is, thus, a 
discrepancy between the multilateral and the preferential agenda, and it could be that 
the reason for going preferential has to do with the content of  the agenda: it seems 
plausible (although unproven as yet) to argue that PTAs are running away with the 
trade agenda of  the 21st century, while the WTO still operates in last century’s terms. 
If  true, then this would be the first serious scare for the multilateral system. As things 
stand, nevertheless, it is too early to pronounce on this score.
B The WTO Law and its Completion
The point in the preceding sub-section was that the WTO seen as a forum for nego-
tiating trade liberalization is a public good the preservation of  which is a function 
of  its policy-relevance: to the extent that the WTO becomes policy-irrelevant, either 
because of  disinterest in multilaterally liberalizing trade from now on, or for any other 
reason, then the point made falls.24
The WTO’s relevance is being challenged but not threatened, so far at least. The best 
supporting argument for this thesis is that trade rounds (like the Doha round) are an 
integral part of  but do not exhaust the bicycle in the bicycle theory discussed above. 
The WTO has life in between rounds: it administers the existing agreements, and it 
completes them. Let us take each point in turn.
The WTO has in place dozens of  committees which take care of  everyday busi-
ness: they run the notifications procedures aimed at reducing transaction costs, 
decide on ‘agreed interpretations’ (like the definition of  period of  investigation in the 
23 Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir. ‘Beyond the WTO: An Anatomy of  the EU and US Preferential Trade 
Agreements’, 33 The World Economy (2010) 1565.
24 Note that the recent US initiative to liberalize trade in services among some like-minded nations only, and 
not across the total WTO Membership, is supposed to take place within the WTO in the form of  plurilat-
eral agreement. Similar initiatives are, thus, not undermining the policy relevance of  the WTO.
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antidumping context),25 and even manage to settle an impressive number of  disputes 
so that the administrative burden for WTO adjudicating bodies is reduced.26 In a way, 
this function of  the WTO is a public good in itself, in that the WTO thus ‘completes’ the 
originally ‘incomplete’ contract.
The point is that the WTO can generate public goods by clarifying for all its Members 
the ambit and content of  its various rules. This is best illustrated by the function of  
the WTO adjudicating bodies and is intimately connected to the inclusion of  domestic 
instruments in the WTO edifice. Recall Baldwin’s intuition that the shift towards dis-
ciplining domestic instruments rationally followed the disciplining of  border instru-
ments. As far as time is concerned, the shift starts in the 1960s with the Kennedy 
round, albeit in a timid way at first. It is the successful conclusion of  the Tokyo – and 
even more so the Uruguay – round that mark the definitive shift towards the multilat-
eral disciplining of  domestic instruments.
Yet, the inclusion of  domestic instruments presented negotiators with more than 
they could have handled: first, there is an extremely large number of  different domes-
tic policy instruments with a trade impact; secondly, domestic policies are responsive 
to changes in the underlying economic/political environment, and as a result keep 
changing themselves. One possibility would be that the agreement specified for each 
Member the policies to be pursued in each and every situation that the Member might 
find itself  in – that is, that the agreement is ‘state-contingent’ in economic jargon. 
But, of  course, with the agreement intended to be in place for an extended period of  
time, there would be a huge number of  such different economic/political situations 
that would call for different policy responses. As a result, WTO Members would have 
to be in constant negotiation, which probably also means the absence of  an interna-
tional trade agreement: the costs of  negotiating and drawing up such a grand con-
tract would be huge, and would most likely greatly outweigh the gains it would bring. 
Indeed, it would amount to central planning on a global scale. This is one reason why 
trade agreements are ‘incomplete’, in the sense that they do not contain all the infor-
mation necessary for their operation at the moment of  their inception.27 Moreover, 
contracting social policies might be deemed politically undesirable in some quarters.
Contractual incompleteness can of  course, take many forms:28 undertakings may 
not be conditional on changes in the environment, they can be ‘rigid’; undertakings 
can also leave ‘discretion’ to individual governments to determine their policies uni-
laterally. The problem, of  course, is that in this scenario, when discretion is permit-
ted, there are good reasons to believe that governments have incentives to use such 
discretion for protectionist purposes, as a substitute for the border instruments that 
25 See Mavroidis, ‘No Outsourcing of  Law? WTO Law as Practised by WTO Courts’, 102 AJIL (2008) 421 for 
a more general discussion of  secondary law in the WTO-context.
26 See, e.g., WTO Doc. G/TBT/29 of  8 Mar. 2011, where it is made clear that a number of  disputes coming 
under the aegis of  the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) are being resolved at the commit-
tee level.
27 See G.M. Grossman, H. Horn, and P.C. Mavroidis, Principles of  World Trade Law: National Treatment (2012).
28 See Horn, Maggi, and Staiger, ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’, 100 Am 
Economic Rev (2010) 394.
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have been bound. This is essentially where the political economy literature kicks in. 
Contractual incompleteness by itself  is not necessarily a problem; governance prob-
lems are posed when incomplete contracts are combined with opportunism.29 The 
GATT does not eliminate the potential for such behaviour: WTO Members will usually 
have private information when regulating which they have to reveal only in part (by 
virtue of  the transparency obligation) and a strong incentive to cheat (by pretend-
ing, for example, to be internalizing environmental externalities when acting solely, or 
predominantly, in the interest of  their domestic producer, and thus imposing costs on 
their trading partners through beggar thy neighbour policies30).
Economic theory and the negotiating record see eye to eye on this score: the 
Chairman of  the Technical Sub-committee in charge of  preparing the draft provi-
sion on national treatment (NT) during the London Conference in 1946 noted to this 
effect:31
Whatever we do here, we shall never be able to cover every contingency and possibility in a 
draft. Economic life is too varied for that, and there are all kinds of  questions which are bound 
to arise later on. The important thing is that once we have this agreement laid down we have 
to act in the spirit of  it. There is no doubt there will be certain difficulties, but if  we are able to 
cover 75 or 80 or 85 per cent of  them I think it will be sufficient.
They thus knowingly left the provision ‘incomplete’, to be gradually ‘completed’ 
through subsequent adjudication (and, eventually, renegotiation). Some renegotia-
tion did indeed take place: the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments is a good 
example, but, nevertheless, it did not manage to resolve many issues. The GATT could 
of  course have been completed through renegotiation. The negotiating costs of  this 
procedure are quite high since de facto all of  the WTO Membership has to be on board. 
Kennedy32 discusses the implementation of  an agreed TRIPs amendment to provide 
empirical evidence of  the very sizeable costs associated with this procedure.
In the absence of  a (re)negotiated solution, it will be left to the WTO judge to decide 
whether particular interventions do or do not contravene the spirit of  the ‘incomplete’ 
contract. The GATT/WTO judge has indeed been called upon to do that through case 
law.33 It is important to note at the outset of  this discussion that the WTO is equipped 
with a highly unusual (for international relations) dispute settlement system: the 
compulsory nature of  third party adjudication in the WTO means that a vast number 
29 See Williamson, ‘Why Law, Economics and Organization?’, 1 Annual Rev L and Social Science (2005) 369.
30 Maskin and Tirole, ‘Unforeseen Developments and Incomplete Contracts’, 66 Rev Economic Studies (1999) 
83 have persuasively argued that the manner in which we think about incomplete contracts is not opti-
mal. They point out that, instead of  discussing contingencies, contractual parties could be discussing 
pay-offs. There are doubts, however, whether their model can fit the GATT. With respect to some of  the 
policies (potentially) covered by NT, it is at least doubtful that governments would be willing to negotiate 
specific disciplines and (eventually) pay-offs.
31 UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/7.
32 Kennedy, ‘When Will the Protocol Amending the TRIPs Agreement Enter into Force?’, 13 J Int’l Economic 
L, (2010) 459.
33 See Maggi and Staiger, ‘The Role of  Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements’, 
126 Q J Economics (2011) 475.
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of  disputes have been submitted to it so far.34 Pushing the decision on to the adjudicat-
ing bodies is not risk-free, since, depending inter alia on the information in the original 
contract (or lack of  it), the judge may be committing errors (both false positives and/
or negatives). The allocation of  the burden of  proof  as well as the quantum of  proof  
required will hold the key in developing a clear judicial strategy towards distinguish 
wheat from chaff  so to speak.
The WTO judge does not start from a clean slate and its hands are not free. The 
judge is an agent bound by the agency contract signed with the principals, the WTO 
Members. The contract reads:
The dispute settlement system of  the WTO is a central element in providing security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve 
the rights and obligations of  Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the exist-
ing provisions of  those agreements in accordance with customary rules of  interpretation of  
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of  the DSB cannot add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
It follows that the WTO judge cannot undo the balance of  rights and obligations as 
struck by the WTO Members: it must respect the policy space entrusted to the WTO 
by all trading nations and transfer to the international plane sovereignty that the 
principals did not themselves agree to transfer.35 Its job of  course would have been 
easier if  the contract had been clearer, that is, more ‘complete’. Alas, it is not. Its dis-
cretion to clarify it is not open-ended either: the WTO judge, from the first case it was 
called to address (US – Gasoline), has understood the reference to ‘customary rules 
of  interpretation of  public international law’ included in Article 3(2) DSU as tanta-
mount to a reference to the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties). The 
VCLT contains many interpretative elements, but does not decide how much weight 
should be given to each of  them.36 Consequently, the WTO judge is in an unenvi-
able position: it is called on to interpret one incomplete contract (the GATT) through 
another (the VCLT).
From a purely methodological perspective, because the contract is incomplete the 
judge must:
(a) decide on the coverage of  this provision;
(b) decide on the understanding of  its key terms.
34 Close to 440 disputes in its first 15 years, a record number of  state to state adjudications where private 
parties have no standing.
35 There is no stare decisis in the WTO. Still, the legitimacy of  WTO courts depends largely on the manner 
in which they treat their own case law. They are expected to apply the same law to the same transactions 
irrespective of  the identity of  the parties involved in a particular dispute. There is definitely something 
in the colloquial saying ‘justice must be blind’. When adjudicating on disputes, judges and courts will 
be preparing their own demise: they will make law so predictable that in good faith there will be little to 
argue about. Of  course, new laws, and new knowledge regarding the manner in which specific issues 
should be treated cast some doubt on this statement. The basic mould though should hold.
36 When following contextual, as opposed to teleological, interpretations respecting the in dubio mitius 
maxim, the WTO judge runs a substantially lower risk of  undoing the balance of  rights and obligations 
struck by the principals.
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Through case law, thus, WTO adjudicating bodies will be providing a public good by 
clarifying the existing agreements which, for the reasons mentioned, are ‘incomplete’.37
Some might question that the law-making exercise (and its completion through 
adjudication) is indeed a public good, and often for good reasons. Indeed, what kind of  
public good is it to introduce an Agreement on Antidumping which legalizes decisions 
taken without considering economy-wide welfare effects? In my view, similar argu-
ments are misplaced because the counterfactual to the existing Agreement (which 
is nowhere near my ideal scheme to deal with international price discrimination) is 
‘the law of  the jungle’: at least now an investigating authority will have to account 
for a series of  procedural requirements when imposing duties which on occasion con-
strain its discretion and might even lead to non-imposition. Absent this disciplining, 
uncertainty would reign regarding the conduct of  domestic institutions in charge of  
trade policy. It is true that there is little theoretical and empirical work analysing the 
value of  WTO institutions (especially its legal institutions) in reducing uncertainty for 
prospective exporters. A notable exception is Handley:38 in a dynamic model involving 
heterogeneous firms he shows that uncertainty would delay the entry of  exporters 
into new markets and would also make them less responsive to applied tariff  reduc-
tions. He tests all this empirically by investigating Australian imports in 2004 and 
2006 to underscore his point that the WTO legal regime has a beneficial effect on 
trade by reducing uncertainty regarding the exercise of  trade policies at the national 
level: the more the contract is ‘completed’ through case law, the less uncertainty sur-
vives of  course.
C Making Use of  the WTO for Private Ends
Proponents of  the hegemonic theory will go so far as to argue that Home’s tariff  
reductions are a public good, since many can profit from them. This view should not 
be accepted; first, there is rivalry in consumption here since demand for goods is not 
typically infinitely elastic. Exports by source A to Home’s market will diminish exports 
by B of  the same good to the same destination, even if  B is not excluded from making 
use of  the concession. In the presence of  rivalry in consumption, one cannot speak of  
public goods, at least in its commonplace definition (no rivalry in consumption, and 
no excludability). Secondly, Home will be asking Foreign to make tariff  concessions in 
a matter of  interest to it and not necessarily to the rest of  the world.
Staiger39 held correctly that the WTO is a public good used by trading nations to 
pursue private ends. Pursuing private ends may lead to prisoner’s dilemma-type 
37 Whether the WTO has done a good job in this respect is outside the ambit of  this article, and is very much 
a question of  the benchmark used to evaluate the record so far. The various papers presented annually 
in the ALI Reporters’ Studies suggest that the methodology used in reaching outcomes is wanting in the 
majority of  cases; even when they agree with the final outcome, all authors almost always disagree with 
the methodology used by WTO adjudicating bodies.
38 Handley, ‘Exporting Under Trade Policy Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence’, WTO: Staff  Working Paper 
ERSD 2011–20 (2011).
39 Supra note 1.
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situations, and this is where our discussion supra regarding bargaining externalities 
becomes relevant. The evaluation of  the WTO insurance policy against this risk is 
hard for a number of  reasons. It is, of  course, possible to leave the WTO, but no one 
has left so far: does this suffice for a conclusion that the WTO is as strong as ever? 
No, since ‘cheap’ temporary exit is possible through violations of  the agreed obliga-
tions; the WTO is, after all, a self-enforcing contract where bargaining asymmetries 
matter, so who would dare to retaliate against the EU or the US (other than either 
of  them)? And yet we do not see trade wars very frequently, and when they do occur 
they concern a small, insignificant part of  international trade. Bown’s40 edited vol-
ume strongly supports the conclusion that the WTO has survived not only bargaining 
externalities but self-centred unilateral behaviour as well: post-crisis the evidence is 
that few trading nations have had recourse to few – very few indeed by any reasonable 
benchmark – trade protection measures. Theory has yet to come up with an explana-
tion, as the many contributions in Bown’s volume suggest. Optimists support the view 
that it is because of  the WTO that the financial crisis did not turn into a trade crisis as 
well. Indeed, the parallels with 1929 have been discussed in literature as have been 
the divergent responses of  the international community then and now.41 The bicycle 
seems to be going in the right direction in this respect at least.
3 The WTO and Public Goods
The WTO has not adopted a particular stance towards public goods. True, the pre-
amble does contain explicit language acknowledging that trade liberalization under 
the auspices of  the WTO should go hand in hand with
the optimal use of  the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of  sustainable devel-
opment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment …
Similar language would suggest that the bridge to supplying or aiding the realization 
of  public goods would be provided somewhere in the Agreement. It is not. The WTO 
does not address public goods in a meaningful manner, that is, beyond the hortatory 
language cited above which does not reflect legally binding obligations for its Members.
With the exception of  TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights), the WTO 
is a negative integration contract, where domestic policies will be defined unilaterally 
and, to the extent that they exhibit international spill-overs, the latter will have to be 
internalized essentially through non-discrimination. The question whether a domes-
tic policy yields a public good or not is simply immaterial to WTO law which cares only 
about ensuring compliance with WTO, and not whether WTO Members pursue public 
goods or not through their interventions.
The absence of  common policies entails the absence of  any discussion regard-
ing a WTO view towards similar policies, assuming some of  them could qualify as 
public goods.
40 See C.P. Bown (ed.), The Great Recession and Import Protection (2011).
41 See D.A. Irwin, Peddling Protectionism (2011).
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The Appellate Body in its EC – Asbestos case law did state that it would adopt a more 
deferential standard of  review whenever public health was at stake, and this is the 
only pronouncement to this effect. It did not link its standard to the provision of  a pub-
lic good though.42 In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body was dealing with a challenge 
to a US measure ostensibly aiming to protect a public good (clean air) and applied its 
usual standard of  review under Article XX GATT without controlling for the fact that 
the protection of  a public good was at stake.
One might think that the regulation of  electronic commerce would point to a 
different solution here: after all, electronic commerce is a vehicle of  ideas, free 
speech, etc. Yet electronic commerce is treated by the WTO as a mode of  supply of  
services which must, like any other mode of  supply, respect the various disciplines 
included in GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), like national treat-
ment, MFN, etc. There is no positive integration with respect to electronic com-
merce: the so-called ‘consensus statement’ adopted by WTO Members to this effect 
is no more than an acceptance of  the applicability of  these principles (which do not 
question the negative integration character of  the GATS) in the sphere of  electronic 
commerce.43
One would have a hard time equating intellectual property rights with public 
goods, since they are characterized by monopoly rents and hence by an elements of  
excludability.
4 Conclusions
The analysis above points to the following conclusions:
(a) The WTO provides a forum for tariff  negotiations that otherwise would not exist 
because of  a collective action problem. The forum can be viewed as a public 
good in the sense that all WTO Members can profit from its existence and can 
use it to advance private ends. The caveat here is that non-members cannot 
have access to it.
(b) A legal arsenal to support the agreed trade liberalization is necessary for rea-
sons having to do with the incentive of  governments to renege on their prom-
ises (many times on political economy grounds). Unfortunately, nevertheless, the 
legal arsenal is obligationally incomplete, and to this effect the WTO adjudication 
process provides an additional public good by completing the contract for all WTO 
Members.
(c) This WTO function is especially important between trade liberalizing rounds, 
since the major part of  adjudication concerns the interpretation of  non-tariff  
barriers: as tariffs are gradually reduced to irrelevance and most of  protection 
takes regulatory form, the value of  case law gains in importance.
42 The case concerned a regulatory barrier that would ban sales of  asbestos containing construction 
ma terial into France.
43 WTO Doc. S/L/74 of  27 July 1999.
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(d) On the other hand, the WTO has nothing particular to say regarding its stance 
towards public goods in terms of, say, a more deferential standard of  review 
towards them. The WTO disciplines on subsidies certainly ‘help’ WTO Members 
to provide public goods themselves; as a matter of  WTO law, though, there is no 
incentives to do so, WTO Members remaining free to act as they deem best. This 
is the unavoidable result of  the quintessential character of  the WTO contract 
which, with the exception of  the TRIPs Agreement, is a negative-integration 
contract.
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